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CORRESPONDENCE 
Territoriality and the Perils of Formalism 
Mark P. Gergen* 
Recently in this journaP Donald Regan published a pair of essays 
on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America. 2 Much of the first essay 
elaborates his theory that what the Supreme Court should be doing 
and w.hat it is doing3 under the dormant commerce clause is checking 
state laws adopted with a substantial protectionist purpose.4 The rest 
of the first essay and all of the second essay develop a different check 
on state lawmaking power in interstate affairs: a rule that states may 
not regulate conduct beyond their borders. He calls this the extraterri-
toriality principle. Elsewhere I have questioned whether Regan's the-
ory of protectionism is sufficient to explain what the Court is and 
should be doing under the dormant commerce clause. 5 Here I want to 
question the extraterritoriality principle. My argument is that it 
works poorly, if it works at all, as a check on the regulatory authority 
of states. I also make the broader point that Regan's two proposals 
are overly formal. They blind us to what should be our real concerns 
when reviewing state laws that affect out-of-state interests and may 
generate an intolerable number of bad results. At the end I briefly 
sketch an alternative approach to these problems that is more open-
ended. 
Regan initially states the extraterritoriality principle vaguely: 
"For the most part, states may not legislate extraterritorially, 
whatever exactly that means."6 If this is all there were to the principle 
it would be uninteresting. But he adds a critical gloss: what states 
may not do is directly regulate behavior beyond their borders. 7 This 
• Assistant Professor, University of Texas School of Law. - Ed. Doug Laycock provided 
invaluable criticism. 
1. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Com-
merce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865 (1987). 
2. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). 
3. See 107 S. Ct. at 1653 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
4. This is developed at length in Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Mak-
ing Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986). 
5. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEXAS L. REV. (1988) (forthcoming) [here-
inafter Selfish State]; Gergen, Equality and the Conflict of Laws, 73 IOWA L. REV. (1988) (forth-
coming) [hereinafter Conflict of Laws]. 
6. Regan, supra note 1, at 1896. 
7. Id. at 1899. 
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rule has two components. First, states may indirectly influence for-
eign behavior by acting upon its local effects. Michigan, for example, 
may influence Indiana polluters by making them liable for emissions 
that poison Michigan air. Second, states may not regulate foreign be-
havior directly. Regan's example of the difference between direct and 
indirect regulation of foreign behavior is hard to improve on. Michi-
gan may ban cigarette smoking within its borders whatever the effect 
of the prohibition on southern industry. Michigan may not directly 
prohibit the manufacture of cigarettes in North Carolina. 8 
The distinction between direct and indirect extraterritorial regula-
tion is what makes Regan's proposal different from other territorialist 
theories. The problem with most territorialist theories is that once we 
allow states to regulate foreign behavior because of the local effects of 
such behavior, a power states clearly enjoy today, nearly all extraterri-
torial laws pass constitutional scrutiny. After all, states really care 
about regulating foreign behavior only when it affects them.9 Regan 
puts some teeth back into the territorial principle by denying states the 
power to regulate foreign behavior directly whatever its local effects. 10 
This is the heart of Regan's theory. He refers to the distinction 
between regulating local and foreign behavior to explain why the 
Court may have been right in CTS and in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 11 
respectively upholding and striking down Indiana and Illinois laws 
regulating tender offers. Both laws imposed restrictions on transfers 
of corporate stock in tender offers. For Regan the important differ-
ence between the two cases is that the Indiana law regulated only 
tender offers for firms incorporated in the state while the Illinois law 
also regulated offers for firms doing substantial business in the state 
but incorporated elsewhere.12 Having decided that transfers of corpo-
rate stock occur in the state of incorporation, 13 Regan concludes that 
Indiana was regulating internal behavior within its sphere of authority 
8. Id. at 1899-900. 
9. The only hard cases under an effects principle are those where citizens of states travel 
abroad, are injured, and then return home and claim the protection of their home state's laws or 
courts. The power of states to act even in these cases may be squeezed under an effects principle; 
indeed, it is hard to keep it out because the local implications of foreign injuries are hard to 
distinguish from other jurisdictional effects. Gergen, Conflict of Laws, supra note S. 
10. It is somewhat ironic that while making a plea for territorialism, Regan agrees that states 
may regulate their citizens when they go abroad. Regan, supra note 1, at 1906-10. I tend to 
agree with him that states do and should have such power. See Gergen, Conflict of Laws, supra 
note 5. This raises the question whether states may regulate out-of-slaters to protect citizens 
from injury when they travel to other states. Regan d?es not consider this issue. 
11. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). 
12. Regan, supra note 1, at 1897, 1899. 
13. Id. at 1878-79. 
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while Illinois was regulating foreign stock transfers. 14 
But Regan's extraterritoriality principle is ultimately a poor tool 
for defining the limits of state power in interstate matters. The princi-
ple does not seriously restrain the states. Whatever ends a state might 
wish to accomplish by directly regulating foreign behavior usually can 
be met by indirect regulation. To take Regan's hypothetical Michigan 
cigarette ban, by making it a crime, punishable by death, to manufac-
ture a cigarette that finds its way into Michigan, the state may accom-
plish much the same thing as directly prohibiting cigarette 
manufacture in North Carolina. Faced with such a risk, cigarette 
plants across the nation would quickly be closed by their owners. If 
this seems far-fetched, consider the effectiveness of punitive damage 
remedies for defectively designed products used in-state as a means of 
directly regulating the manufacture of products abroad. Or consider 
the law in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor 
Authority. 15 It required liquor wholesalers to affirm that they would 
sell liquor nationally at a price no higher than they sold it in the state 
in the preceding month. The Supreme Court struck down the law, the 
correct result in Regan's view because of the extraterritoriality princi-
ple.16 New York was impermissibly reaching out directly to regulate 
the price at which liquor is sold outside the state. But New York 
could accomplish much the same end by making the law retrospective, 
requiring liquor wholesalers to charge no more for sales in-state than 
they charged nationally in the preceding month. This saves the law 
from the extraterritoriality objection (as Regan observes)17 because 
such a law does not directly regulate foreign pricing. 18 
One may even purge the taint of extraterritoriality from Illinois's 
law seeking to influence shifts in ownership or corporations doing sub-
stantial business in the state but incorporated elsewhere. Directly reg-
14. Other scholars consider these decisions hard to reconcile. See, e.g., Langevoort, The 
Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on crs Corp. v. Dynamics 
Corp. of America, 101 HARV. L. REV. 96, 97 (1987). 
15. 476 U.S. 573 (1986). 
16. Regan, supra note 1, at 1903. 
17. Id. at 1905. 
18. In Brown-Forman the Court limited its decision to prospective pricing laws. It had ear-
lier upheld a retrospective law in Joseph E. Seag:arn & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 
(1966). Whether Seagram remains valid is unclear. The Brown-Forman Court said: "(W]e do 
not necessarily attach constitutional significance to the difference between a prospective statute 
and the retrospective statute at issue in Seagram. Indeed, one could argue that the effects of the 
statute in Seagram do not differ markedly from the effects of the statute at issue in the present 
case." 476 U.S. at 584 n.6. This broadening of the rule in Brown-Forman is fatal to Regan's 
proposal. If the extraterritorial effects of regulating local behavior give rise to constitutional 
objections, a host oflaws becomes suspect and some sort of balancing will be necessary to tell the 
good from the bad. 
1738 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1735 
ulating stock transfers is barred if we agree with Regan that they take 
place in the state of incorporation. But Illinois may regulate the local 
effects . of changes in corporate ownership. If the state fears local 
plants will close and assets will be taken outside the state, it may pro-
hibit such actions if they closely follow a takeover that violates stipu-
lated standards. The regulation's direct effect is internal; it only 
indirectly discourages tender offers (and so stock transfers) outside the 
state.19 
In the case of laws not drafted to avoid the principle it may be 
difficult to tell whether what is being regulated is extraterritorial be-
havior or its local effects. Consider a libel law: does it penalize the 
libelous utterance made outside the state or its publication in the state? 
What if a speaker's good faith is made an absolute defense? Does that 
make the law more a regulation of foreign behavior since now it speaks 
directly to foreign behavior? Or consider a law that imposes civil lia-
bility for polluting state water. Is it regulating the act of polluting or 
the in-state effect? One would probably say the latter, but what if the 
law makes it a defense that the polluter used the best available technol-
ogy? Now it seems to be directly regulating out-of-state behavior. 
Some laws regulate intangible things which occur in no particular 
place. Applying the principle then depends upon the fictional location 
of the thing regulated. Regan considers one such problem at length: 
locating transfers of corporate stock.20 Another example is state laws 
regulating interstate consumer credit.21 Whether such laws seek to 
regulate in-state or out-of-state behavior depends upon the fictional 
location of contract formation, an issue that never was satisfactorily 
resolved in choice of law. 
If jurists apply the territorial principle mechanically, focusing on 
whether laws regulate local effects or foreign causes by examining 
their objective form, these problems will be resolved in ways that often 
seem arbitrary and incorrect. Consider an out-of-state lender who 
specifies that its advertisements are solicitations of offers and that loan 
19. It is not clear that Regan would strike down all such laws as protectionist under the 
co=erce clause. He suggests that laws may not be protectionist if states adopt them because 
they think it would be better for all states if industry was less mobile. Regan, supra note 1, at 
1871-72. How to deal with selfish policies pursued by states for nonselfish reasons is a perplexing 
problem for a motive-based theory. I suggest elsewhere that this same issue is posed by the 
interest-based approach to choice oflaw. There I conclude that while it is not so bad if states act 
selfishly for honorable reasons, the point is of little practical consequence because it is hard to 
distinguish in practice between evil and benign acts of selfishness. Gergen, Conflict of Laws, 
supra note 5. 
20. Regan, supra note l, at 1876-79. 
21. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code extends restrictions on charges to loans made by 
residents outside states. UCCC § l.201(7)(a) (1974). 
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applications will be accepted, and loans made, at its home-office. A 
judge who mechanically applies the principle that states may not di-
rectly regulate foreign behavior could strike down a law regulating 
such an out-of-state loan. This would be required by the principle of 
extraterritoriality, taken literally, but it is bad constitutional law. 
Regan recognizes that it is often difficult to tell whether a law regu-
lates local or foreign behavior. Speaking of the specific problem of 
locating transfers of corporate stock (or other intangible things) Regan 
argues, "This is the sort of difficulty formalism leads to. In the end, 
some hard cases must simply be decided by judicial intuitions concern-
ing the spirit of the Constitution."22 He concludes that stock transfers 
occur in the state of incorporation for the sensible, policy-based reason 
that some state (but only one state) should be able to regulate corpo-
rate transfers. The state of incorporation is as likely a candidate as 
any.23 Be clear what Regan is doing. He resolves the familiar problem 
of indeterminacy by telling the Court to consider what is good policy 
at the levels of formulating principle and of classifying laws (or the 
behavior they regulate) as internal or extraterritorial. The principle of 
extraterritoriality is little more than a facade, at least in hard cases,. 
behind which the Court will decide cases on the basis of "intuitions 
concerning the spirit of the Constitution." 
This is worse than balancing (Regan's bete noire) for several rea-
sons. Regan would require courts to express decisions in terms that 
have nothing to do with our real concerns. Laws regulating tender 
offers, for example, would seem to rise or fall not on the weight of the 
state interest served and the burden to the nation, but rather on the 
fictional placement of stock transfers. Decisions will be less candid if 
they do not explain the real reasons why the principle was applied in a 
particular fashion. This makes decisions less persuasive. It mystifies 
those who do not know that the application of the principle of territo-
riality in specific cases depends upon "judicial intuitions concerning 
the spirit of the Constitution." Perhaps worst of all, some jurists may 
take the principle literally and strike down good laws because they 
seem to regulate foreign behavior directly. If there were few hard 
cases, or if the distinction between direct and indirect extraterritorial 
regulation was relevant to any real concern, these problems with Re-
gan's proposal would be tolerable. But, as we have seen, many cases 
will be hard because there is no clear distinction between regulating 
foreign behavior and regulating its local effects. 
22. Regan, supra note 1, at 1879. 
23. Id. at 1878-79. 
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Regan's version of territoriality has little to do with our real con-
cerns. Territorialism rests on the belief that the essential division of 
authority between states is territorial, and, in some more extreme ver-
sions, that this division of authority carries with it the ideal that every 
event is subject to only one authority.24 The ideal of singular sover-
eignty is unattainable, of course, for it is inevitable in a world where 
behavior touches several states that each sovereign will claim the au-
thority to act upon it. But even if we wanted a territorialist system 
with singular sovereignty, Regan's direct/indirect distinction is not a 
reasonable way to allocate power. If an Indiana polluter poisons 
Michigan air, whether Michigan properly regulates his behavior has 
nothing to do with how directly it acts upon the out-of-stater. What 
matters is the weight of Michigan's interest in the out-of-state behav-
ior. Indeed, making directness relevant has the perverse effect, noted 
earlier, that Michigan could impose strict liability for polluting its air 
but it could not make the foreign polluter's use of the best available 
technology a defense. 
This brings us to a broader criticism of Regan's approach to the 
problem of limiting the power of states in interstate matters. This goes 
not only to his principle of territoriality (which Regan proposes tenta-
tively), but also to his more important proposal that in enforcing the 
dormant commerce clause the Supreme Court should be concerned 
only with checking laws adopted with a substantial protectionist pur-
pose (to enrich local commercial interests at the expense of foreign 
interests). I have explained in some detail the problems with this pro-
posal elsewhere and will only summarize the argument here. While a 
concern with protectionism is a vital part of the law, it is not sufficient 
to explain what the Court is doing or should be doing. Many state 
laws adopted with the likely purpose of enriching locals at the expense 
of out-of-staters (examples include subsidies to local industry, quaran-
tines or embargoes of infected goods, and reciprocal laws) are toler-
ated. 25 At the same time, some laws will be struck down despite their 
nonprotectionist motives (examples include a tariff adopted to raise 
revenues and an embargo adopted to protect the environment).26 
Looking at this pattern, and asking what is our real concern when 
states make laws that affect out-of-state interests, it seems to me that 
24. This is Doug Laycock's territorialist manifesto. Regan comes close to saying this when 
he reasons that territorialism is implicit in the geographic division of sovereignty, Regan, supra 
note l, at 1887-95, and, more importantly, when he insists an important function of the territori-
ality principle is to ensure that events are regulated by one, but only one, sovereign. Id. at 1882, 
25. Gergen, Conflict of Laws, supra note 5; Gergen, Selfish State, supra note 5. 
26. Gergen, Conflict of Laws, supra note 5. 
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what we want to check is state laws of disutility, or laws that enrich 
states but at greater expense to out-of-staters or the nation. A concern 
with protectionism is consistent with this, for, as Regan observes, laws 
adopted with a purpose of enriching citizens at the expense of out-of-
staters are likely to be inefficient. 27 This also explains why subsidies, 
quarantines, and reciprocal laws may be tolerated, for either they are 
likely to be of positive utility (quarantines enhance the general welfare 
by preventing the spread of disease), or it is impossible to craft a rule 
prohibiting them that would not imperil laws of positive utility (subsi-
dies such as hire-local laws should be tolerated because they cannot be 
distinguished from public employment programs). And it explains 
why we must sometimes prohibit laws though their motive is not evi-
dently protectionist. States may injure out-of-staters, and harm the 
nation as a whole, by adopting laws with disregard for out-of-state 
interests, as well as by consciously trying to take advantage of such 
interests. 
Regan is not blind to these problems. Sometimes he manipulates 
the principles to avoid bad results. For example, in the case of grossly 
uneven but well-motivated laws (tariffs adopted to raise revenues or 
en;ibargoes adopted to protect the environment) Regan is willing to 
assume their motive is bad without regard to the actual evidence.28 
And he saves subsidies from the rule by fiat: only laws "analogous in 
form to the traditional instruments of protectionism" are prohibited. 29 
(This is akin to his proposal that the location of geographically inde-
terminate acts, like stock transfers, be defined with an eye to what is 
the most sensible rule.) But other times the rigidity of the principles 
forces unattractive, and probably unnecessary, outcomes. For exam-
ple, by prohibiting only traditional forms of protectionism Regan 
would allow certain subsidies, such as preferences for citizens in the 
sale of goods by state-owned plants, that could and should be stopped 
under a more flexible standard. Jo 
This may not be bad. We may be so concerned that the Court will 
take advantage of a license to balance that we want to force it to work 
within fairly rigid principles that constrain its discretion. If there is a 
justification for Regan's principle of protectionism, it is this. 
But there may be a better approach. Establish the principle that it 
is not the province of the Court to weigh closely the costs and benefits 
27. Regan, supra note 4, at 1115-20. 
28. Id. at 1119-23. I explore this inconsistency at length in Gergen, Conflict of Laws, supra 
note 5. 
29. Regan, supra note 4, at 1095. 
30. Gergen, Selfish State, supra note 5. 
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of laws. When state laws are challenged, the primary issue is whether 
their motive was substantially protectionist. But do not close the sys-
tem there. Though the motive of a law seems bad, let it be upheld if 
the state can make a strong showing that its benefits outweigh its 
costs. In undertaking this analysis pay close attention to precedent. If 
a law is the sort of protectionist law that has been tolerated in the past 
(e.g., a subsidy, quarantine, or reciprocal law), the Court should in-
cline to uphold it. This makes incremental change in either direction 
possible. If a law is on the margin of something traditionally allowed 
- for example, a preference for citizens in sales of goods from state-
owned plants - but it seems inefficient, precedent should not save it. 
Ultimately, the traditional rule, if it is a bad one, will be eaten away. 
Conversely, though a law seems a product of no ill will, the Court 
should not be reluctant to strike it down if it seems the costs greatly 
outweigh the benefits. Again, attention should be paid to whether it is 
the sort of law, such as an embargo, which is usually forbidden. 
This is not that different from Regan's theory of protectionism. 
(His principle of territoriality I would discard entirely.) It just takes 
the concern of utility (or efficiency) that informs much of his analysis 
and brings it closer to the front. The major difference is that rather 
than saying the Court should never balance, I say that it may some-
times do so. But it must be careful not to second-guess plausible pol-
icy judgments and be mindful of the need not to vary too far, too fast, 
from precedent. The advantages are twofold. Perhaps, there will be 
less error. Definitely, cases will be argued and decisions reasoned on 
the basis of the factors actually relevant to how we want them decided. 
